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Abstract
Teams of voting agents have great potential in find-
ing optimal solutions. However, there are funda-
mental challenges to effectively use such teams: (i)
selecting agents; (ii) aggregating opinions; (iii) as-
sessing performance. I address all these challenges,
with theoretical and experimental contributions.
1 Introduction
Teams of voting agents are used in important domains, such
as: machine learning, crowdsourcing, forecasting systems,
and even board games. Voting is popular since it is highly par-
allelizable, easy to implement and provide theoretical guar-
antees [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005]. However, there are
fundamental challenges: (i) Selecting a limited number of
agents; (ii) Combining the opinions of the team members;
(iii) Assessing the performance. In my thesis, I address all
these challenges, with both theoretical and experimental con-
tributions. I explore three different domains: Computer Go,
HIV prevention in social networks and architectural design.
Concerning agent selection, I study the importance of di-
versity. While by previous works in social choice we would
expect the best teams to be uniform teams composed of copies
of the best agent [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005], I show in
Marcolino et al. [2013] the importance of considering diver-
sity when forming teams. My first model only gave necessary
conditions, however, so in Marcolino et al. [2014] I create a
second new model that predicts that diverse teams are better
than uniform teams in problems with a large action space.
Concerning aggregating opinions, I study different ranked
voting rules and ranking extraction techniques. Recently,
ranked voting has received considerable attention [Caragian-
nis et al., 2013]. However, I show that plurality still outper-
forms ranked voting rules in the Computer Go domain [Jiang
et al., 2014], and in the HIV prevention domain [Yadav et
al., 2015]. This is caused by the noise in the rankings of
agents that were originally designed to output a single choice.
Therefore, in Jiang et al. [2014], I introduce a new ranking
extraction technique, based on the frequency that actions are
played when sampling an agent multiple times.
Concerning assessing performance, I introduce a novel
domain-independent technique that allows one to predict
whether a team of voting agents is going to be successful or
fail in problem solving. Such prediction is important to take
remedy procedures to increase a team’s performance. Ex-
isting methods are tailored for specific domains [Ramos and
Ayanegui, 2008]. In Nagarajan et al. [2015] I introduce a
novel domain independent technique, which learns a predic-
tion function using only the voting patterns of a team.
Finally, I am currently exploring domains where the ob-
jective is not simply to find one optimal action, but rather to
maximize the number of optimal solutions found. This is use-
ful in design, where a human can take an aesthetical choice
among all optimal solutions. In Marcolino et al. [2015] I
perform a theoretical study of how diverse an uniform teams
perform for such problems, and I present experimental results
in the architectural building design domain.
2 Theoretical Results
I briefly summarize some of my theoretical models. The first,
presented in Marcolino et al. [2013], shows that a diverse
team can outperform a uniform team if at least one agent has
a higher probability of playing the best action than the best
agent in at least one world state. Since only necessary con-
ditions were provided, I study in Marcolino et al. [2014] the
effect of increasing the number of actions available to choose
from. I define spreading tail (ST) agents, that have an in-
creasingly larger number of actions assigned with a non-zero
probability as the number of actions in the domain increases.
A diverse team is modeled as a team of ST agents. I show
that the probability of a diverse team picking the best action
increases as the action space increases; and also converges to
1 when the team size grows in large action spaces. The main
idea is that diverse agents are less likely to agree on the same
mistakes when the action space is large, and therefore only
two agents voting for the optimal solution is sufficient.
In Nagarajan et al. [2015], I propose a model for team
assessment, which allows me to develop a novel domain in-
dependent technique to predict online the final reward of a
team. The final reward is defined by a random variable; which
is influenced by a set of variablesHj representing the subset
of agents that agreed on the chosen action at world state j.
Based on that, I show that the final reward can be predicted
by linear models, and I derive a prediction function using the
frequencies of agreement of each subset of agents.
Finally, I am currently working in a model of agent teams
for design problems [Marcolino et al., 2015], where the ob-
jective is to find as many optimal solutions as possible across
multiple voting iterations. I show that, unless the best agent
has the same probability of voting for all optimal actions, a
uniform team will invariably converge to a single optimal so-
lution. On the other hand, a diverse team composed of agents
with different preferences maximizes the number of optimal
solutions, given some conditions on the team size.
3 Experimental Results
















Figure 1: Winning rates
as the Go board size
grows.
I summarize here some of the
experimental results. Figure 1
shows one of the results in Com-
puter Go. We see the win-
ning rates of a diverse (com-
posed by the Computer Go play-
ing agents Fuego, Gnugo, Pachi,
Mogo) and a uniform team. The
diverse team starts by playing
slightly worse, but plays bet-
ter than the uniform team with
statistical significance in large




















Figure 2: New ranking
method results.
Figure 2 shows one result
from my novel ranking method-
ology, where a ranking is built
by sampling each agent 10
times. All tested voting rules
outperform plurality, but in the
figure we only show Borda
(which is better with p <
0.007). All voting rules are also
statistically significantly better
than the non-sampled (single
run) version of plurality [Jiang et al., 2014].


























Figure 3: Accuracy for 3
different teams.
Concerning the team assess-
ment problem, Figure 3 shows
the accuracy of my predictions
for the diverse, the uniform
and an intermediate team (com-
posed by different parameteriza-
tions of a single agent). The pre-
diction accuracy is close to 60%
in the middle game, and it goes
to 73% towards the end of the


























found by each system.
Figure 4 shows some of the
results in the building design do-
main, where we see the per-
centage of optimal solutions
found by individual agents and
by different teams, for three
different building design prob-
lems. As we can see, the teams
clearly outperform the individ-
ual agents, and provide a higher
percentage of optimal solutions
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Figure 5: Influence in social
networks.
Finally, Figure 5 shows
one result in the HIV
prevention domain, when
choosing which nodes of
a social network should
be selected across multiple
iterations, in order to max-
imize the influence of HIV
prevention techniques. DC
and POMCP are baselines, while PSINET-S, PSINET-W
and PSINET-C are teams using simple plurality, weighted
plurality and Copeland ranked voting, respectively. As we
can see, weighted plurality has the best result in this domain
[Yadav et al., 2015].
4 Next Steps
There are many open directions for further research. I am cur-
rently studying the performance of mixed voting teams of hu-
mans and artificial agents. Moreover, concerning the work in
HIV prevention [Yadav et al., 2015], it is still open to under-
stand why the Copeland ranked voting rule did not perform
well, and how can the performance be improved with novel
aggregation and/or ranking extraction methodologies.
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